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Abstract
Some studies in experimental pragmatics have concluded that scalar inferences
(e.g., ‘some X are Y’ implicates ‘not all X are Y’) are context-dependent prag-
matic computations delayed relative to semantic computations. However, it
remains unclear whether strong contextual support is necessary to trigger such
inferences. Here we tested if the scalar inference ‘not all’ triggered by some
can be evoked in a maximally neutral context. We investigated event-related
potential (ERP) amplitude modulations elicited by Stroop-like conflicts in par-
ticipants instructed to indicate whether strings of letters were printed with all
their letters in upper case or otherwise. In a randomized stream of non-words
and distractor words, the words all, some and case were either presented in
capitals or they featured at least one lower case letter. As expected, we found
a significant conflict-related N450 modulation when comparing e.g., ‘aLl’ with
‘ALL’. Surprisingly, despite the fact that most responses from the same par-
ticipants in a sentence-picture verification task were literal, we also found a
similar modulation when comparing ‘SOME’ with e.g., ‘SoMe’, even though
SOME could only elicit such a Stroop conflict when construed pragmatically.
No such modulation was found for e.g., ‘CasE’ vs. ‘CASE’ (neutral contrast).
These results suggest that some can appear incongruent with the concept of
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‘all’ even when contextual support is minimal. Furthermore, there was no signi-
ficant correlation between N450 e ect magnitude (‘SOME’ minus e.g., ‘sOMe’)
and pragmatic response rates recorded in the sentence-picture verification task.
Overall, this study shows for the first time that the pragmatic meaning of some
can be accessed in a maximally neutral context, and thus, that the scalar infer-
ence ‘not all’ triggered by some should be construed as context-sensitive rather
than context-dependent, that is, more or less salient and relevant depending on
the context rather than entirely contingent upon it.
Keywords: Experimental semantics and pragmatics, non-literal meaning,
context-dependency, Stroop, event-related brain potentials, N450 e ect
1. Introduction
Consider the following exchange:
(1) A: What time is it?
B: Some of the guests are already leaving. (Levinson, 2000, p. 16)
From B’s answer, it can be expected that A will understand that (i) it must5
be late, and (ii) not all of the guests are already leaving (see Levinson, 2000,
pp. 16-17). Both (i) and (ii) contribute to the pragmatic rather than literal
meaning of B’s utterance and are called implicatures (see e.g., Grice, 1975;
Levinson, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 1995). However, implicatures like (ii)
can be derived because of the mere presence of particular words such as some,10
whereas implicatures like (i) require a specific context and can only be derived
from the complete utterance. The di erence is made apparent when changing
A’s question into “Where is John?” for example (see e.g., Levinson, 2000, p. 17),
in which case implicature (ii) remains valid, whereas implicature (i) does not.
In Grice’s (1975) terms, implicatures such as (i) are Particularized Conver-15
sational Implicatures (henceforth PCIs) and those such as (ii) are Generalized
Conversational Implicatures (GCIs). A particular case of GCI is the scalar im-
plicature or scalar inference (hereafter SI), which is triggered when a linguistic
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expression has a stronger competitor along a scale of informativeness (see e.g.,
Horn, 1972; Horn, 1989; Levinson, 2000). For instance, in (1), some contrasts20
with all and thus can trigger the SI ‘not all’. Other examples of such lexical
scales are Èalways, sometimesÍ, Ènecessarily, possiblyÍ, Èand, orÍ, Èfinish, startÍ,
Èlove, likeÍ, Èhot, warmÍ (see e.g., Levinson, 2000; van Tiel, van Miltenburg
et al., 2014).
Following the footsteps of Grice, some scholars endorsed the GCI – PCI25
distinction and argued that a GCI is the preferred or standard interpretation
of a word such as some “in the absence of special circumstances” (Grice, 1975,
p. 56), relating to “a default mode of reasoning” (Levinson, 2000, p. 42). A GCI
remains an implicature since it is defeasible, that is it can be cancelled without
resulting in a contradiction, contrary to the case of literal meaning (‘at least30
one’ as for some):
(2) Some of the students failed. In fact all of them failed.
#Some of the students failed. In fact none of them failed.
Other scholars have argued that the distinction between GCI and PCI is unfoun-
ded, because all implicatures, including SIs, should be considered particularized35
(see notably Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2004).
The two views presented above have been referred as ‘default’ and ‘context-
driven’ models of SI derivation (see e.g., Breheny, Katsos and Williams, 2006;
Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino, 2013). The former view predicts that SIs are
relatively context-independent, realised immediately and e ortlessly. The latter40
view predicts that SIs are context-dependent, only realised in contexts in which
they are relevant, derived after the processing of semantic meaning and context,
and require additional cognitive e ort.
Some studies in experimental pragmatics have concluded that SIs are cog-
nitively costly (see e.g., Bott and Noveck, 2004; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007;45
Chevallier et al., 2008) and akin to context-dependent pragmatic computations
(see e.g., Breheny, Katsos and Williams, 2006) that are delayed relative to se-
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mantic computations (see e.g., Huang and Snedeker, 2009). However, other
studies have shown that SIs are not necessarily delayed (see e.g., Grodner et
al., 2010; Degen and Tanenhaus, 2015), that the cognitive cost associated with50
them might not stem from the inferencing process itself (Marty and Chemla,
2013; Chemla and Bott, 2014), and that a strong contextual support may not
be needed (Politzer-Ahles and Gwilliams, 2015).
In the present study, we focused on the dependency of SI derivation upon the
context. In experimental pragmatics, SI context-dependency has been mostly55
investigated in reading (see e.g., Breheny, Katsos and Williams, 2006; Politzer-
Ahles and Fiorentino, 2013) by comparing SI-supportive and SI-non-supportive
contexts. In an SI-supportive context, the SI answers the ‘question under dis-
cussion’ (henceforth QUD, see e.g., Roberts, 1996; Beaver and Clark, 2008),
whereas in an SI-non-supportive context, the SI does not answer the QUD. In,60
e.g.:
(3) Mary was preparing to throw a party for John’s relatives. She asked
John whether all/any of them were staying in his apartment. John said
that some of them were. He added that the rest would be staying in a
hotel. (Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino, 2013)65
the predictions drawn from the default and context-driven models are the fol-
lowing: in non-supportive contexts (‘any’), the SI is not available, therefore ‘the
rest’ requires more processing time than in supportive contexts (‘all’) in which
‘not all of the relatives’ becomes relevant and facilitates the bridging inference
that the rest means ‘the rest of the relatives’. The two models di er regarding70
their account of SI unavailability in non-supportive contexts: either it is not
derived because it is not relevant in the context (context-driven model), or it
is automatically derived and then cancelled once it becomes apparent that it is
not relevant (default model). Therefore, the context-driven model predicts an
increase in reading time at the segment containing some in SI-supportive con-75
texts relative to SI-non-supportive contexts. Contrastingly, the default model
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predicts no di erence between conditions since the SI should automatically be
derived in both cases. In self-paced reading studies such as Breheny, Katsos and
Williams (2006) or Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino (2013), an increase in reading
time for the anaphoric noun phrase (e.g., the rest) was recorded in SI-non-80
supportive contexts relative to SI-supportive contexts. However, the increase
in processing for the some-region predicted by the context-driven model was
observed in Breheny, Katsos and Williams’ (2006) study (see also Bergen and
Grodner, 2012), but not in Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino’s (2013) study (see
also Hartshorne et al., 2015). In sum, the results obtained for the anaphoric85
noun phrase suggest that the SI is context-sensitive and thus more salient in
supportive contexts in which it answers the QUD. However, it is remains unclear
whether SI derivation is actually context-dependent.
At this point, we note that Levinson’s (2000) default model of GCIs might
have been inadequately interpreted in the literature. Levinson uses the expres-90
sion “implicature cancellation” in the case of:
(4) A: “Is there any evidence against them?”
B: “Some of their identity documents are forgeries.” (Levinson, 2000,
p. 51)
However, this example of cancellation is given as an example of “predicted95
(but nonoccurring) scalar implicature”, that is, an example of a case in which
“we do not let the inference through. That’s because, intuitively, A is only
interested in whether there is at least some evidence against the criminals; given
A’s question, all that is relevant is the possession of at least some evidence”
(Levinson, 2000, p. 51). Levinson concludes: “It seems then that Relevance100
implicatures, or inferences about the speaker’s goals, can limit the amount of
further inference that is warranted. Thus even where these further inferences are
entirely consistent with all that is known, they do not go through.” (Levinson,
2000, p. 52). In other words, it seems that Levinson makes a similar prediction
as context-driven models: if the SI is irrelevant in the discourse context, it105
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does not arise. Non-supportive any-contexts may thus be part of these “special
circumstances” (see above) in which SIs are not derived.
In a recent study, Politzer-Ahles and Gwilliams (2015) asked participants
whether it was possible, in an example such as (5), that all of John’s relatives
stay in his apartment:110
(5) Mary was preparing to throw a party for John’s relatives. She asked
John whether all/any of them were staying in his apartment. John said
that some of them were.
Only slightly more than 20 % of the responses were ‘yes’ (see Corrigendum), in
either the all-contexts or the any-contexts. Thus, contrary to the predictions115
of both default and context-driven models, the SI ‘not all’ tends to be com-
puted in any-contexts also, even though it is not relevant. Therefore, it appears
that SI derivation does not in fact require much context support. Reciprocally,
supposedly “blocking” contexts such as any-contexts do not guarantee that the
SI will not be derived. MEG results from the same study (Politzer-Ahles and120
Gwilliams, 2015) using the same stimuli, showed greater activation for some in
non-supportive contexts compared with supportive contexts, suggesting greater
e ort to derive the SI in non-supportive contexts. However, it is possible that
the ‘not all’ interpretation may have been constrained by the presence of of
following some in both contexts. Indeed, Grodner et al. (2010, Appendix A)125
showed that the partitive some of is more likely to give rise to the SI than
the bare quantifier some (see also Geurts, 2010, p. 100; Degen and Tanenhaus,
2015).
Another way of investigating SI context-dependency would be to use neutral
contexts, that is, contexts that are unbiased towards a lower or upper-bounded130
interpretation of some. This was the aim of Breheny, Katsos and Williams’
(2006) second self-paced reading experiment. In this experiment, there was
no preceding context to the sentence containing some, however ‘some of the’ +
noun was the grammatical subject or object of the sentence, that is, it was either
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in a topical or non-topical position, respectively. The sentences containing some135
were followed by sentences beginning with a noun phrase meaning ‘the rest’ or
‘the others’:
(6) The director had a meeting with some of the consultants./Some of the
consultants had a meeting with the director. The rest did not manage
to attend.140
If the SI ‘not all consultants met with the director’ is triggered by default, the
referent of ‘the rest’ should be equally accessible no matter where ‘some of the
consultants’ is located in the preceding sentence. In contrast, if the SI is context-
dependent, the referent of ‘the rest’ should be more accessible when ‘some of
the consultants’ is in a topical position, resulting in shorter reading times for145
the anaphoric noun phrase ‘the rest’. This predicted di erence was observed.
However, it can be argued (i) that more time was available to compute the SI
when its trigger was at the beginning rather than the end of the sentence and
therefore that the SI was more likely to influence the processing of the anaphoric
segment in the former case than the latter, and (ii) that the contexts were not150
genuinely neutral, because utterances appear to elicit an implicit context when
they are presented in isolation (see e.g., Geurts, 2010, p. 91, 98; Tian, Ferguson
and Breheny, 2016). Therefore, when ‘some of the consultants’ is the subject of
the preceding sentence, it is more likely that the topic of the implicit discourse
context concerns the consultants rather than the director, and thus that it155
answers the QUD as compared to when it is in non-topical position. In other
words, sentence reading without stated context is not entirely free of contextual
e ects.
In sum, reading studies have shown that SIs are context-sensitive (see also
Bonnefon, Feeney and Villejoubert, 2009; Bergen and Grodner, 2012; Breheny,160
Ferguson and Katsos, 2013; Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2013) as predicted by
both default and context-driven models. However, context-dependency remains
undemonstrated, probably owing to the fact that the context of an utterance
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can essentially never be neutral. In other words, the question addressed here
is: do SIs need strong contextual support to be accessed? Thus, in the present165
study, we elected to present the quantifier some in isolation in order to test the
context-dependency of the SI ‘not all’ when context is maximally neutral. It is
indeed highly unlikely that words presented in isolation would be contextualised
to any great extent. We asked participants to perform a task unrelated to the
meaning of the words presented and investigated whether the ‘not all’ inference170
would hinder the expected response via Stroop-like interference in an event-
related brain potentials (ERPs) experiment.
Most of previous ERP studies have investigated the time course of SIs (see
e.g., Noveck and Posada, 2003; Nieuwland, Ditman and Kuperberg, 2010; Hunt
et al., 2013), their processing cost (see e.g., Hartshorne et al., 2015), or their175
neural correlates (see e.g., Politzer-Ahles, Fiorentino et al., 2013), but, to our
knowledge, no previous study has tested context-dependency directly, and a
fortiori N450 e ects in a Stroop-like paradigm.
In a typical colour-word Stroop task, participants are asked to name the
physical colour of a word which can either be congruent with the meaning of180
the word (e.g., BLUE presented in blue) or incongruent (e.g., BLUE presented
in red). Performance is usually worse, and naming latencies usually slower, for
incongruent trials as compared with congruent (or neutral, e.g., SHOE presen-
ted in blue) trials. Such interference appears to arise from parallel analysis of
task-relevant (physical colour) and task-irrelevant (word meaning) stimulus di-185
mensions (for a review, see MacLeod, 1991). ERP studies investigating such
interference have primarily identified a robust N450 e ect (see e.g., West, 2003;
Markela-Lerenc et al., 2004; Sz cs and Soltész, 2010; Tillman and Wiens, 2011),
alternatively labelled Ni (negativity for incompatible Stroop trials, Eppinger et
al., 2007), N400 (Rebai, Bernard and Lannou, 1997) or MFN (medial frontal190
negativity, Chen et al., 2011). This conflict-sensitive ERP modulation manifests
as an increased negativity over fronto-central to centro-parietal regions between
300–500 ms after stimulus onset for incongruent as compared with congruent (or
neutral) trials. This e ect is found in a variety of contexts, e.g., overt verbal re-
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sponse, covert verbal response, or manual response (see e.g., Liotti et al., 2000),195
as well as in numerical Stroop tasks (see e.g., Sz cs, Soltész and White, 2009).
Here, we presented the words all, some and case in isolation amongst non-
words and distractor words. The stimuli were presented either with all letters
in upper case (e.g., ALL) or as a mix of upper and lower cases letters (e.g., aLl).
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not each stimulus was presented200
with all its letters in upper case. Over and above a classical e ect of physical
form (mixed vs. upper case) expected from the literature (see e.g., Mayall,
Humphreys and Olson, 1997; Mayall, Humphreys, Mechelli et al., 2001; Juhasz
et al., 2006; Arditi and Cho, 2007; Lien, Allen and Crawford, 2012), in the case
of stimuli such as ‘alL’, we expected greater conflict as compared to the case of205
‘ALL’, manifesting as a modulation of the N450, because of the incongruence
between the word’s guise and its meaning. As regards some, two scenarios
were possible. Some can either mean ‘some and possibly all’, or ‘some but not
all’ if an SI is derived. On the one hand, if SI derivation is strongly context-
dependent, the stimuli ‘SOME’ and ‘SoMe’, for instance, should yield similar210
responses because the meaning would not be incongruent with the expected
response. On the other hand, if some can evoke ‘not all’ when contextual
support is minimal, an N450 modulation should be expected for ‘SOME’ as
compared to ‘SoMe’. In the latter situation, the di erence between ‘SOME’
and ‘SoMe’ should resemble the di erence observed between ‘aLl’ and ‘ALL’.215
Finally, we presented the stimulus ‘CASE’ and variants such as ‘CaSe’ as a
neutral control with the expectation that no Stroop conflict would occur for
this word.
We also investigated participant’s pragmatic behaviour in a task similar to
that used by van Tiel and Schaeken (2016) to measure literal vs. pragmatic220
response styles in the presence of contextual information. In this second experi-
ment, participants had to indicate whether under-informative some-statements
(e.g., “Some of the circles are green.”) provided a good description of a situ-
ation depicted by means of a figure (e.g., a mixed line-up of circles and squares
in which all circles are green). Results from this o -line experiment allowed225
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us to compare spontaneous processing of some indexed by ERPs in a minimal
context condition with pragmatic behaviour in a context-rich condition.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty-four native speakers of English (20 females; mean age = 21.8, SD = 7.2)230
gave written consent to take part in the experiment approved by the Ethics
Committee of Bangor University, United Kingdom. All were students from the
School of Psychology and were given course credits for their participation. All
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The data of 7 participants had to
be dismissed due to excessive artefacts in the EEG recordings (see section 2.2.3235
for details). Therefore, statistical analyses of behavioural and ERP results are
based on 27 individual data sets.
2.2. ERP experiment
2.2.1. Materials
Critical stimuli were the words some (pragmatic test), all (semantic test), and240
case (neutral control) intermixed with three or four-letter filler non-words (rop,
fusk, cauv, urbe, tarb, demb, soys, tovs, gyte, kilv) and four-letter distractor
words (font, zero, each, none, most) so as to avoid directing special attention
to the critical stimuli. All stimuli appeared in Courier New size 14 points
subtending approximately 1 degree of visual angle at the centre of a 19” CRT245
monitor with all letters in upper case or as a mix of upper and lower case letters
(see Fig. 1).
The analysis focused on two factors: word-type (all, some, case) and case-type
(upper case, mixed case), resulting in a 3 ◊ 2 experimental design. In the mixed
case condition, the number and position of upper case letters systematically250
varied within words and non-words (i.e., aLl, alL, ALl, aLL, AlL; SOme, SoMe,
sOMe, soME, sOmE; etc.). ‘All’, ‘Some’, ‘Case’, ‘Font’, etc. were avoided
because of regular sentence case, and some with only one upper case letter was
10
Figure 1: Example of stimulus sequence and expected responses. Critical test stimuli
have a bold frame. Note that critical stimulus density is exaggerated in this example in order
to show all six types of critical stimuli.
also avoided because of the ambiguity surrounding its minimal meaning (‘at least
one’ or ‘more than one’?). Importantly, stimulus congruence was manipulated255
in opposition to case-type for the two critical stimuli all and some, since ‘ALL’
was semantically congruent with its guise whereas ‘SOME’ was pragmatically
incongruent with its guise.
2.2.2. Procedure
Participants were told that they would see strings of letters presented one at260
a time. They were asked to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible
whether or not all letters were capital letters by pressing designated left and right
buttons on a response box. Response side was counterbalanced between parti-
cipants. Stimuli were presented in a fully randomized sequence with the words
some, all and case appearing 60 times in upper case (CAPS condition) and 60265
times as a mix of upper and lower case letters (MiXEd condition). Each of the
four-letter filler non-words appeared 22 times in each of the CAPS and MiXEd
conditions, the three-letter filler non-words appeared 24 times and each of the
5 distractor words appeared 60 times, leading to a total of 1044 filler/distractor
trials and 360 test trials. Each stimulus was displayed for 1000 ms or until270
participant’s response, whichever was the shortest, with a randomly selected
inter-stimulus interval of 460, 480, 500, 520, or 540 ms in order to reduce cross-
trial ERP contamination. A training phase preceded the experiment involving
36 exemplars of the stimuli. Participants needed less than 30 minutes to com-
plete the task in 4 blocks, and were invited to take a break between blocks at275
their convenience.
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2.2.3. EEG recording and analysis
Electroencephalographic (EEG) data were recorded continuously at a rate of 1
kH in reference to electrode Cz with an online bandpass filter set between 0.01–
200 Hz from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes using SynAmp2 amplifiers (Neuroscan Inc.,280
El Paso, TX, USA). Electrodes were attached to an elastic cap (Easycap™,
Herrsching, Germany) and placed according to the extended 10-20 convention.
The ground electrode was placed at FPz. Bipolar electrodes were placed to the
left of the left eye and to the right of the right eye (HEOG) and above and
below the right eye (VEOG) to record eye movement artefacts. Impedances285
were kept below 5 k  for the 64 recording electrodes and below 10 k  for the
eye electrodes.
Before segmentation, continuous EEG activity was filtered low-pass using a
zero phase shift digital filter with a cut-o  frequency of 20 Hz and high-pass
filter with a cut-o  frequency of 0.1 Hz. After visual inspection to dismiss major290
artefacts (dismissing 157 trials out of 12240, i.e. 1.3 %), eye blinks were math-
ematically corrected based on the procedure advocated by Gratton, Coles and
Donchin (1983). After correction, any trial with amplitude exceeding ± 100 µV
at any point within an epoch and at any recording site except VEOG and HEOG
was discarded from analysis (2.2 % of the remaining trials). Continuous EEG295
activity was segmented into epochs ranging from -100 to 1000 ms after stimulus
onset. Baseline correction was performed in reference to pre-stimulus activity,
and individual averages were digitally re-referenced to the global average refer-
ence. Only correct trials were kept for the analyses (dismissing 11.1 % of the
remaining trials). Seven individual data sets were discarded due to excessive300
noise and/or alpha contamination resulting in undetectable early components
(P1-N1 complex), leading to an average of 51.4 (SD = 5.6) trials per condition.
We proceeded with data analysis in two stages: (i) Comparing mean ERP
amplitude di erences between experimental conditions; (ii) Conducting a cor-
rected Stroop-like conflict analysis with ERP data controlled for physical di er-305
ences between conditions induced by case-type, i.e., after subtracting from each
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individual condition the signal contribution of case-type in order to validate the
congruence e ects.
(i) In the first analysis, we investigated the main e ects of word-type and case-
type and, critically, the interaction between the two factors. We measured310
the N1-P2 complex between 175–225 and 265–315 ms, respectively (that
is 50 ms around grand-average peak times and in good agreement with
component morphology in the literature), at posterior sites of predicted
and observed maximal amplitude (P7, PO7, PO9, P8, PO8, and PO10).
The negative modulation by Stroop conflict was analysed between 350–315
450 ms (the predicted time-window based on previous studies, see e.g.,
Rebai, Bernard and Lannou, 1997; Liotti et al., 2000; West, 2003; Markela-
Lerenc et al., 2004; Eppinger et al., 2007; Sz cs, Soltész and White, 2009;
Sz cs and Soltész, 2010; Tillman and Wiens, 2011; Chen et al., 2011,
the average N450 temporal window computed from these 9 studies is 354–320
460 ms) over 9 predicted fronto-centro-parietal electrodes (FC1, FCz, FC2,
C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, CP2).
In addition, we observed a late positive complex (LPC) between 500–
700 ms at electrodes FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, and CP2
where it reached maximum observed amplitude.325
(ii) In the corrected Stroop conflict analysis, we first subtracted the mean
amplitude of CAPS and MiXEd combined averages across all, some and
case, in each participant and each individual condition. In other words,
this analysis compared the ERPs elicited by each of the critical stimuli
after deducting Mean(ALL, SOME, and CASE) from CAPS conditions,330
and Mean(aLl, alL, ALl, aLL, SOme, SoMe, sOMe, soME, sOmE, cASe,
CAse etc.) from MiXEd conditions.
We then analysed again the N1-P2 complex, N450 and LPC in the same
temporal windows and at the same electrode locations as before.
In all cases, mean amplitudes, and peaks latency, were analysed using repeated335
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measures ANOVAs with case-type, and word-type as within-subject factors.
2.3. Sentence-picture verification task
2.3.1. Materials
The sentence-picture verification task included 54 some-trials: 18 unambigu-
ously true, that is, informative (see Fig. 2A), 18 unambiguously false (Fig.340
2B) and 18 under-informative (Fig. 2C). Sentences were built on the follow-
ing template: ‘Some of the [circles/squares/triangles] are [blue/green/red]’ and
paired with an image depicting five coloured geometrical shapes. The 9 possible
di erent associations of shapes and colours were presented twice but paired with
di erent images. The sentence-picture verification task also comprised 342 filler345
trials involving all, none, most, two, conditional perfection (e.g., Each of the
shapes is green if it is a triangle, see e.g., Geis and Zwicky, 1971), exhaustivity
in it-clefts (e.g., It is the squares that are blue), and free choice inferences (e.g.,
Each of the circles are red or blue, see Chemla and Bott, 2014; van Tiel and
Schaeken, 2016).350
Some of the triangles are green.
A
B
C
Figure 2: Example of some-statement in the sentence-picture verification task. A.
Informative, B. False, and C. Under-informative trials.
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2.3.2. Procedure
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not sentences were good de-
scriptions pictures by pressing dedicated buttons on a response box. Response
side was counterbalanced between participants, and the stimuli were randomly
presented. When participants had read a sentence (presented for a maximum355
of 4 seconds), they could press any button for the associated picture to be dis-
played, and then had up to 3 seconds to provide their response. A short training
session involving 14 unambiguous trials with feedback preceded the main task.
Participants needed around 30 minutes to complete the task in 4 blocks, and
were invited to take a break between blocks at their convenience.360
3. Results
3.1. ERP experiment
3.1.1. Behavioural results
Accuracy (M = 88.2 %, SD = 32.25, see Fig. 3A) was analysed using lo-
git mixed models1 (see e.g., Jaeger, 2008) including the maximal random ef-365
fect structure justified by the design (see e.g., Barr et al., 2013), namely by-
participant random intercepts and by-participant random slopes for word-type,
case-type and their interaction. We computed p-values by performing likelihood
ratio tests in which a model with the fixed e ect of interest was compared with
an otherwise identical model without the said fixed e ect.370
The first model revealed a significant word-type ◊ case-type interaction
(‰2(2) = 28.06, p < .001). Analyses by word-type conditions showed that the
interaction was driven by a significant e ect of case-type restricted to all (‰2(1)
= 31.05, p < .001; some: ‰2(1) = 1.97, p = .16; case: ‰2(1) = 0.19, p > .6).
Analyses by case-type conditions showed no e ect of word-type in the CAPS con-375
dition (‰2(2) = 2.2, p > .3), but a significant e ect of word-type in the MiXEd
1Logit mixed models fitted using the R (R Core Team, 2014) package lmerTest (Kuznet-
sova, Bruun Brockho  and Haubo Bojesen Christensen, 2014).
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Figure 3: Behavioural results. A. Accuracy, B. Reaction times, for all, case, and some as
a function of case-type. Integers indicate means, and error bars represent SEM by participants.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
condition (‰2(2) = 44.4, p < .001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests2 within the MiXEd
condition showed that accuracy was significantly higher for some relative to case
(— = 0.41, SE = 0.15, z = 2.69, p < .05) and all (— = 1.51, SE = 0.16, z =
9.48, p < .001), and for case relative to all (— = 1.1, SE = 0.15, z = 7.3, p <380
.001).
Reaction times (see Fig. 3B) were analysed using linear mixed models3
(see e.g, Bates, 2005; Baayen, Davidson and Bates, 2008; Baayen and Milin,
2010) including maximal random structure justified by the design, that is, by-
participant random intercepts and by-participant random slopes for case-type,385
word-type and their interaction. The final models included removal of outliers
(data points with absolute standardised residuals exceeding 2.5 standard devi-
ations, see e.g, Baayen and Milin, 2010). Only reaction times from accurate
responses were kept for the analysis, 11.8 % of data points were therefore dis-
missed, leaving 8574 data points out of 9720.390
There was a significant e ect of case-type on reaction times (F(1,26) = 23.7,
2Tukey’s post-hoc tests were performed using the glht function of the R package multcomp
(Hothorn, Bretz and Westfall, 2008).
3Linear mixed models fitted using the R package lmerTest.
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p < .001, ÷2p = .46)4. RTs to all and case increased by around 27 ms in the
MiXEd compared with the CAPS condition, but only by around 19 ms for
some, see Fig. 3B. However, there was no interaction between case-type and
word-type (p > .5).395
3.1.2. ERP results
Grand-average ERP waveforms are displayed in Fig. 4, 5, and 6. CAPS
and MiXEd conditions markedly di ered in ERP amplitude starting at around
180 ms after stimulus onset (see Fig. 4).
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Figure 4: ERP modulations elicited by case-type. Left, Grand-average ERP waveforms
elicited over the parieto-occipital region (linear derivation of P7, PO7, PO9, P8, PO8, PO10)
in the CAPS (black line) and MiXEd (grey line) conditions; Right, Grand-average ERP wave-
forms elicited over the central region (linear derivation of FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1,
CPz, CP2) in the CAPS (black line) and MiXEd (grey line) conditions.
N1 mean amplitudes were significantly modulated by case-type (F(1,26) =400
87.9, p < .001, ÷2p = .77), see Fig. 4 and 5. This factor marginally interacted
with word-type (F(2,52) = 2.7, p = .077, ÷2p = .09), due to the N1 e ect varying
4We used the anova function of lmerTest which provides analysis of variance tables of type
3 with denominator degrees of freedom calculated based on Satterthwaite’s approximation.
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Figure 5: N1, P2 and LPC mean amplitudes as a function of case-type, and
MiXEd minus CAPS topographies. Left, N1 (175–225 ms) mean amplitudes in the
parietal-occipital region elicited in the CAPS and MiXEd conditions, and MiXEd minus CAPS
N1 topography; Middle, P2 (265–315 ms) mean amplitudes in the parietal-occipital region
elicited in the CAPS and MiXEd conditions, and MiXEd minus CAPS P2 topography; Right,
LPC (500–700 ms) mean amplitudes in the central region elicited in the CAPS and MiXEd
conditions (error bars represent SEM), and MiXEd minus CAPS LPC topography. *** p <
.001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
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slightly in magnitude between word conditions (all: M = -1.41 µV; case: M
= -1.95 µV; some: M = -2.08 µV). Nonetheless, the MiXEd condition elicited
significantly greater amplitude than the CAPS condition for all word-types (all:405
F(1,26) = 32.1, p < .001, ÷2 = .55; case: F(1,26) = 50.12, p < .001, ÷2 =
.66; some: F(1,26) = 61.3, p < .001, ÷2 = .70). N1 mean peak latencies were
marginally modulated by case-type (F(1,26) = 3.2, p < .1, ÷2 = .11), in the
absence of an interaction with word-type (p > .6). MiXEd elicited slightly
delayed N1s compared to CAPS5.410
P2 mean amplitudes were also significantly modulated by case-type (F(1,26)
= 14.32, p < .001, ÷2 = .35), but this factor did not interact with word-type
(p > .5). MiXEd elicited greater P2 amplitudes than CAPS words, see Fig. 4
and 5. P2 mean peak latencies were not significantly modulated by case-type
(F(1,26) = 2.5, p = .13), and there was no interaction with word-type (p > .6).415
Critically, in the N450 range, previously established as the Stroop con-
flict time-window, mean amplitudes were marginally modulated by word-type
(F(2,52) = 2.45, p < .1, ÷2p = .09), were not modulated by case-type (p > .6),
and there was a significant interaction between the two factors (F(2,52) = 11.18,
p < .001, ÷2p = .30). Analyses by word-type conditions showed a significant e ect420
of case-type for all (F(1,26) = 6.7, p < .05, ÷2 = .20), and some (F(1,26) =
5.6, p < .05, ÷2 = .18), but not for case (F(1,26) = 1.54, p = .226), see Fig.
6. MiXEd (incongruent) all significantly increased N450 mean amplitudes re-
lative to CAPS (congruent) all. As for some, this e ect was reversed, that is,
N450 mean amplitudes were significantly increased for CAPS relative to MiXEd.425
There was no significant di erence between CAPS and MiXEd case.
LPC mean amplitudes, see Fig. 4 and 5, were significantly modulated by
case-type (F(1,26) = 12.3, p < .01, ÷2 = .32), such that MiXEd elicited greater
LPC amplitudes than CAPS, but this factor did not interact with word-type (p
> .6).430
5Note that the N1 e ects reported here were mirrored over central regions of the scalp in
the form of a vertex positive potential (VPP, see e.g, Eimer, 2011), see fig. 4 and 6.
19
-100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 
0 
2 
- 2 
Am
pli
tu
de
 (µ
V)
 
-100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 
0 
2 
- 2 
Time (ms) 
Am
pli
tu
de
 (µ
V)
 
-100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 
0 
2 
- 2 
Am
pli
tu
de
 (µ
V)
 
0 
2 
1 
3 * 
0 
2 
1 
3 
* 
0 
2 
1 
3 
n.s. 
CAPS 
MiXEd 
N450 (350-450 ms) 
aLl-ALL 
SOME-SomE 
CaSe-CASE 
+1.5 
-1.5 
0 µV 
some 
all 
case 
CAPS MiXEd 
CAPS MiXEd 
CAPS MiXEd 
M
ea
n A
m
pli
tu
de
 (µ
V)
 
M
ea
n A
m
pli
tu
de
 (µ
V)
 
M
ea
n A
m
pli
tu
de
 (µ
V)
 
+1.5 
-1.5 
0 µV 
Figure 6: E ect of case-type and congruence in the N450 range. Grand-average
ERP waveforms elicited over the central region (linear derivation of FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz,
C2, CP1, CPz, CP2) in the CAPS (solid black line) and MiXEd (solid grey line) conditions,
mean amplitudes in the central region between 350–450 ms as a function of case-type, and
N450 e ect (incongruent minus congruent) topography, for all (top), some (middle), and case
(bottom). *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
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We then proceeded to analysing ERP amplitudes after correction of physical
di erences (see Methods section 2.2.3). There was no main e ect of case-type
on N1 mean amplitudes (p > .1), but there was a marginal interaction between
case-type and word-type (F(2,52) = 2.7, p = .08, ÷2p = .08) driven by stimulus
all (F(1,26) = 6.2, p < .05, ÷2 = .19). There was no main e ect of case-435
type or interaction between case-type and word-type on N1 mean peak latency
of corrected ERPs, but a marginal main e ect of word-type (F(2,52) = 2.9, p
= .07) driven by a significant di erence between some and case (Bonferroni
adjusted p < .05).
Corrected P2 mean amplitudes were not significantly modulated by either440
case-type or word-type, and there was no interaction between the two factors
(all ps > .1). Corrected P2 latencies were only a ected by word-type (F(2,52) =
3.8, p < .05), an e ect driven by a significant di erence between case and some
(Bonferroni adjusted p < .05).
In the N450 range, the e ect of case-type was preserved (F(1,26) = 9.8,445
p < .01, ÷2p = .27) and the interaction between case-type and word-type was
significant (F(2,52) = 11.2, p < .001, ÷2p = .30). Analyses by word-type showed
that the e ect of case-type was significant for the semantic test condition all
(F(1,26) = 17.2, p < .001, ÷2 = .40), the pragmatic test condition some (F(1,26)
= 10.2, p < .01, ÷2 = .28), but not the neutral control condition case (F(1,26)450
= 1.538, p = .226), see Fig. 7. Furthermore, when excluding the neutral
condition case from the analysis, and after conversion of the case-type factor
to congruence since the meaning of ALL was congruent with its physical form
whereas that of SOME was pragmatically incongruent, the N450 e ect proved
of lesser magnitude for some than all, as shown by a marginal congruence ◊455
word-type interaction (F(1,26) = 3.95, p = .057, ÷2p = .13, see Fig. 7).
Finally, LPC e ects did not survive physical di erences correction (all ps >
.5).
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Figure 7: Stroop-like conflict e ect on ERPs corrected for physical di erences.
Grand-average corrected ERP waveforms elicited over the central region (linear derivation of
FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, CP2) in the CAPS (solid black line) and MiXEd
(solid grey line) conditions for all (top), some (middle), and case (bottom). *** p < .001, **
p < .01, * p < .05.
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3.2. Sentence-picture verification task
Logical response rates were high overall (Mean = 0.79, Median = 0.94, SD =460
0.28; see Fig. 8). Six participants gave 9 or less logical responses out of 18,
12 participants gave 10 to 17 logical responses, and 9 participants only gave
logical responses. Therefore, only 6 participants out of 27 could be considered
“pragmatic”.
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Figure 8: Distribution of logical responses to under-informative some-statements.
There was no significant correlation between the number of logical responses465
and the N450 e ect elicited by some in the ERP experiment (i.e. incongruent
SOME minus congruent e.g., SoMe N450 amplitude, r = -.24, p = .22).
4. Discussion
Using ERPs in a Stroop-like paradigm involving upper case and mixed case
letter strings, we investigated whether the scalar inference ‘not all’ triggered470
by some is derived when some is presented in isolation, i.e. in a situation of
minimal context.
As expected, longer RTs for MiXEd than CAPS stimuli showed that the
MiXEd condition proved more demanding than the CAPS condition (see e.g.,
Mayall, Humphreys and Olson, 1997; Mayall, Humphreys, Mechelli et al., 2001;475
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Juhasz et al., 2006; Arditi and Cho, 2007; Lien, Allen and Crawford, 2012). Sig-
nificant di erences in accuracy expected from the Stroop conflict only appeared
for all. ERPs collected simultaneously also revealed a main e ect of physical
form in N1, P2 and LPC time-windows, with greater amplitudes and/or delayed
latencies generally observed for MiXEd as compared to CAPS stimuli. Critic-480
ally, raw ERPs, and ERPs corrected for physical di erences, showed significant
increases in amplitude for incongruent relative to congruent stimuli in the pre-
dicted N450 time-window. Some, in particular, produced the ERP modulations
that one would expect if its meaning were construed pragmatically.
Accuracy results obtained in the all condition suggest that our Stroop con-485
flict manipulation worked: Performance was hindered for incongruent MiXEd
all as compared to congruent CAPS all. We note however that, in the case
of incongruent all, ‘l’ having the same physical height as ‘L’ as in e.g., ‘ALl’,
could have relatively increased the magnitude of the Stroop-like conflict for all6.
Furthermore, the relative lack of a clear behavioural Stroop e ect in the case490
of some (e.g., when comparing SOME vs. SomE) could be due to the MiXEd
condition (in which some was congruent under our hypothesis) being overall
more demanding as discussed above. Nevertheless, accuracy in this condition
was higher for some than for case, suggesting that some was processed with
more ease than case when its pragmatic meaning (‘some but not all’) was con-495
sistent with its guise. The absence of a clear behavioural Stroop e ect for some
may also be due to its suboptimal appearance (from a pragmatic point of view)
when presented in MiXEd form. Indeed, a stimulus featuring two upper case
and two lower case letters is compatible with quantifiers such as ‘half’ or ‘two’.
Whereas upper case all may be considered perfectly congruent, and mixed case500
all, perfectly incongruent with the meaning of all, some only enjoys a perfect
status in its upper case, pragmatically incongruent form (SOME). In its prag-
matically congruent form (e.g., sOmE), half or two rather than merely some of
6After removal of the ambiguous occurrences of MiXEd all (‘ALl’ and ‘AlL’) from the
analysis, the Stroop-like e ect on accuracy vanished (mean accuracy incongruent all = 92 %).
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the letters are in upper case, which is pragmatically suboptimal, because some
is taken to mean at least/more than one and less than half, and numbers tend505
to be preferred to some in the subitising range (see e.g., Kaufman et al., 1949;
Degen and Tanenhaus, 2015). Considering the fact that the word has only four
letters, we could not implement a pragmatically optimal form of some in this
experiment.
The overall processing di culty of the MiXEd relative to the CAPS condi-510
tion was also reflected in event-related brain potentials through greater mean
amplitudes in the N1, P2 and LPC ranges7. The modulation by case-type in
the N1 and P2 ranges reflects di culty with visual feature-to-letter mapping as
predicted by models of visual word recognition (see e.g., Bi-modal interactive
activation model (BIAM), Grainger and Holcomb, 2009). The N1 modulation515
observed for MiXEd as compared to CAPS is compatible with the kind of mod-
ulation observed previously when letters are rotated in words (see Kim and
Straková, 2012). The interaction between case-type and word-type further sug-
gested a reduced case-type e ect for all, probably because the letter ‘l’ has the
same height as an upper case letter (whereas all letters in some or case have a520
di erent height in upper and lower case), or because ‘l’ can be confused with ‘I’,
making its status as a lower case letter ambiguous. After correction for physical
di erences, a marginal congruence ◊ word-type interaction remained, driven by
all, arguably due to the correction process: The case-type modulation was smal-
ler in the all than in the some and the case word-type conditions, resulting in a525
harsher correction for all than for some or case, thus artificially increasing the
CAPS/congruent vs. MiXEd/incongruent di erence. Note that the case-type ef-
fect which extended into the LPC window in the raw ERP analysis, disappeared
7Note that we found no sign of a P1 amplitude modulation by low-level physical di erences
between case-type conditions. This is surprising given the controversy in the face-processing
literature regarding the sensitivity of the P1 to di erences between stimuli in terms of e.g.,
size, disparity and shape (see Thierry et al., 2007; Dering et al., 2011 vs. Rossion and Jacques,
2008; Eimer, 2011).
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after correction for physical di erences.
The Stroop conflict revealed by an N450 modulation (see e.g., Liotti et al.,530
2000; West, 2003; Markela-Lerenc et al., 2004; Sz cs, Soltész and White, 2009;
Sz cs and Soltész, 2010; Tillman and Wiens, 2011) was obtained in the semantic
test condition all (e.g., aLl vs. ALL), as well as the pragmatic test condition
some (SOME vs. e.g., SoMe), indicating that some presented in isolation is
construed as incongruent with ‘all’, that is, even when extraction of its meaning535
is irrelevant and not required to complete the task at hand. The Stroop conflict
e ect elicited by some was however less strong than that elicited by all. This
needs not indicate that, albeit pragmatic in origin, the meaning of some was less
compelling than that of all. Indeed, this may be interpreted as a task/stimulus
e ect: As noted above, whereas all may be considered perfect in its congruent540
(ALL) or incongruent (e.g., aLL) guises, some only enjoys a perfect status in
its pragmatically incongruent guise (SOME).
The N450 conflict e ect observed for SOME is overall incompatible with a
strong context-dependency view of the SI ‘not all’, given that in a situation
of minimal linguistic context, SOME is not construed as congruent with the545
concept of ‘all’. Our results suggest that the ‘not all’ meaning of some might be
represented in memory rather than computed on the fly as suggested by some
theoretical accounts (see e.g., Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2004), and
thus that some may be ambiguous in the mental lexicon. Psycholinguistic stud-
ies have provided empirical evidence that multiple meanings of ambiguous words550
are activated during early stages of processing, before a single interpretation is
ultimately selected based on meaning frequency and context (see e.g., Swinney,
1979; Onifer and Swinney, 1981). However, lexical and semantic information
retrieval is expected to occur at around 200 ms post-stimulus onset (see e.g.,
Martin et al., 2014; Hauk et al., 2012), and thus the N450 e ect reported here555
cannot inform lexical-semantic stages of information processing. Overall, our
results are consistent with the view that the SI is the predicted meaning of some
in the absence of special circumstances (Levinson, 2000, see Introduction section
1). Our results may also be consistent with a grammatical account according
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to which SIs are derived within grammar and are not pragmatic in essence. In-560
deed, it seems that a specific context is needed for SIs not to arise according
to such view: A silent operator Only is inserted whenever possible, and SIs are
not licensed only in specific contexts (see e.g., Chierchia, 2004; Chierchia, Fox
and Spector, 2012).
Our results show that some does not need a strong contextual support to565
appear inconsistent with the meaning ‘all’. An alternative hypothesis could be
that all appearing as frequently as some, might have rendered the lexical scale
Èall, someÍ (see e.g., de Carvalho et al., 2016) and thus the contrast between
some and all salient to participants despite the presence of a high number of
filler and distractor trials. More likely, making all/not all CAPS decisions may570
have elicited an implicit context calling for an ‘all in CAPS?’ Question Under
Discussion (see Introduction section 1). Such QUD may have resulted in word
association participating in the Stroop conflict. Indeed, the words some and all
are strongly associated (see e.g., Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus, Kiss et al.,
1973), and psycholinguistic studies have shown that interference e ects are mod-575
ulated by association strength: Colour words that are less strongly associated
with the concept of colour produce less Stroop interference (see e.g. Scheibe,
Shaver and Carrier, 1967; Proctor, 1978). Therefore, the Stroop conflict found
for SOME could also partly originate from the association between the words
some and all. However, the ‘all in CAPS?’ QUD fails to account entirely for580
the e ect observed for some because it predicts a Stroop-like e ect also for case
since neither SOME nor CASE are forms of the word all. Furthermore, even if
an ‘all in CAPS?’ QUD in the experimental context was su cient to support
the SI ‘not all’, it remains that the SI was irrelevant in the task at hand, and
the results therefore do not support the view according to which SI derivation585
is dependent upon contextual relevance.
A strong context-driven model of SI, or at least of the ‘not all’ SI triggered
by some (generalising to all SIs would probably be flawed, see e.g., van Tiel,
van Miltenburg et al., 2014), according to which an SI is only computed when
it is contextually relevant, is not supported by our data. Reading the word590
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some appears su cient to evoke inconsistency with ‘all’. Note that we are not
arguing here for context-insensitivity: Even if the SI is evoked by some in isol-
ation, hearers should be more or less committed to it depending on contextual
information.
Interestingly, most of the participants of this study could be considered595
“logical” since almost 80 % of the under-informative some-statements were con-
sidered good descriptions in the sentence-picture verification task. Yet, the same
participants exhibited a Stroop-like conflict when presented with the pragmatic-
ally incongruent stimulus SOME in the ERP experiment. This seems to indicate
that “logical” behaviour may stem from cognitive strategising rather than mere600
linguistic processing. At least, this result calls for caution when making hypo-
theses concerning processing on the basis of metalinguistic judgements.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we aimed at testing the context-dependency of the SI ‘not all’
triggered by some. In order to do so, we presented the quantifier in a minimal,605
that is, single word context in a Stroop-like task. An N450 modulation, marker
of Stroop conflict, elicited by the pragmatic incongruent CAPS some, similar
to that found for the semantic incongruent MiXEd all, revealed that the quan-
tifier on its own can evoke the inference ‘not all’, or at least can be considered
inconsistent with ‘all’. This argues for context-sensitivity rather than strong610
context-dependency of SI derivation in the case of some: The scalar inference
‘not all’ should be construed as more or less salient and relevant depending on
the context rather than entirely contingent upon it. Further research is how-
ever required to clarify interactions between lexical-semantics, default heuristics,
predicted meaning, and genuine pragmatic processing.615
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